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Commentary
by
Gilbert J. Helwig*
In response to the request of the authors of the study "Products
Liability: A Study of the Interaction of Law and Technology" that I
offer a critique from the litigation firing line, I would suggest that certain facets of the proposed alterations in products liability trials merit
further consideration. Trial counsel's stake in a responsive trial system
is obvious; their sense of responsibility to the judicial system compels
their receptive and critical evaluation of possible modifications. I hope
these following observations will afford additional insight to the reader.

I.

IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE STUDY'S RECOMMENDATIONS

From my reading of the study, I do not understand that the authors
have yet reached the point that they have proposed any particular mode
of assuring compliance with the recommendations contained in the
study, as by amendment to rules of civil procedure, adoption of pretrial rules, or other possible alternatives. It is my suggestion that no
such broad based rule or procedure be sought, which would require the
use of these procedures in all product liability cases, at least for the
present. I think a better mode of implementation would be to try to
encourage the use of the method they suggest either by the voluntary
action of attorneys who are interested in the approach through seminars
or personal contact, or by the use of an individual pre-trial order in a
particular case by some able and innovative judge. In this way, some
empirical data could be gathered which could be later used either to
re-evaluate the proposals or as an aid to getting a broader adoption of
the proposed procedures. I think that most of the precedures which are
proposed could be required or used in such a trial without any rules
change or any change in the laws of evidence. This would at least be
true in federal court actions if the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
are approved by the Congress, as I believe is very probable.
*
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II.

PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY
WITH WHICH EXPERTS EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS

Many courts, of course, still feel compelled to require an expert to
express his opinion to an absolute certainty, rejecting the alternative of
his expressing an opinion in terms of "probabilities" or "possibilities."
Sometimes this difficulty, especially in the case of medical experts, is
surmounted by permitting the expert to express his opinion in terms of
"reasonable medical certainty." I suspect the same flexibility could be
obtained in most courts which countenance this by permitting any
expert to testify on the basis of "reasonable professional certainty." In
my dealings with the physicians who are disturbed about the apparent
absolutism which they believe the law requires of them in expressing
medical opinions, I have developed the practice of instructing the
physicians that I do not believe the law requires them to have formed
an opinion to an "absolute" degree of certainty, but only to that degree
of certainty which they feel would justify their undertaking some reasonably serious or extensive medical procedure. I have never seen any
case which discussed this kind of pragmatic test, but it seems to me
that it is a good measure of the professional judgment if the medical
expert would be convinced to that degree. It is somewhat analogous to
the instruction given juries with respect to reasonable doubt. I feel
no compunction about advising a medical witness that if he has this
degree of certainty he may honestly state in court that, in his professional opinion, that fact is so without being concerned about the semantics of the apparent absolute certitude of that expression.
Happily, more and more courts are recognizing the appropriateness
of permitting an expert to express his opinion in terms of "best judgment" or "more probable than not," although generally speaking there
is a tendency to exclude expressions of opinions in terms of "possibilities" only. I think that, here again, reform is probably needed,
either by more liberal judicial interpretation or by the adoption of
explicit rules or codes of evidence.
I suspect that the dogmatic assertions of experts, to which the authors
refer in their study, are the product of this evidentiary requirement,
rather than of the natural tendency of the experts themselves. I think
this is an area somewhat analogous to the problems which psychiatrists
have in adapting their testimony to the inappropriate semantic re-
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quirements of the law and that if the law were changed the problem
would disappear.
On the other hand, I have serious misgivings about the proposal
contained in the study that experts be required to express their evaluations of probabilities in qualitative form. I doubt if, in most cases, there
is a truly scientific basis for such qualitative measurements and I suspect we would merely be imposing another bit of legal mumbo jumbo
on the expert by insisting that he state his opinion of probabilities in
percentage forms.
III.

How THE EXPERT EXPRESSES

His

OPINION

The concern expressed in the study in this area centers on two distinct problems: (a) the requirement that a hypothetical question be
addressed to the expert (except where he is testifying on the basis of
personal knowledge); and (b) the related assumption that the expert
is required to accept the 100 per cent probability of the truth of the
facts stated in the hypothetical question.
Many courts are moving away from the requirement that the hypothetical question be used. The new Federal Rules of Evidence will permit the trial judge, in his discretion, to allow the expert to express his
opinion without showing the foundation, leaving that to be developed
as part of his further examination or cross-examination. I suspect this
will become the normal procedure and will do much to alleviate the
stilted and awkward form in which the expert is required to testify at
the present time. However, I think that if the trial is not merely to
become a battle of prestigious experts, where the jury is pretty much
to decide on the basis of apparent qualification which opinion to accept where there is a dispute, I think due regard must be had for permitting a reasonable opportunity to explore the facts which the expert
has assumed to be true or more probably true than not and on which
his judgment rests. Thus, the jury, if it forms a different opinion on
the probable existence of such facts, can take that into consideration in
determining whether to accept or reject the opinion of the expert.
In addition, I question whether the form of the normal hypothetical
question ("assuming that so and so and so and so occur ..

.

.")

tech-

nically requires that either the expert or the jury assume there is a
"100 per cent certainty" of the existence of that fact. I think the logical
foundation is only that the matter be assumed to be true conditionally
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or concessively for purposes of permitting the opinion to be expressed.
This leaves both the expert and the jury free to discuss and to evaluate,
in terms of the usual burden of proof that is whether a given proposition is more probably true than not, in evaluating the merits of the
whole issue. Perhaps the concerns expressed in the study could be met
by a procedure under which the expert would be given some reasonable
opportunity to express his inability to accept as being more nearly true
than not certain of the facts set forth in the hypothetical which is
addressed to him. Perhaps the matter could also be addressed in terms
of ethical responsibility of requiring both the expert and the attorney
not to incorporate into a hypothetical question facts assumed to be
true where the expert cannot, in conscience, accept, on the basis of
the evidentiary facts, that such assumed fact is probably true.
IV.

THE EXPERT'S QUALIFICATIONS

Perhaps there is a personal bias of my own against permitting the
legal system to become too much subject to elitist control. I am opposed to permitting a group of experts in any field to lay down absolute
requirements limiting the right of any person to testify as an expert.
I think the formulation of criteria by such experts and the communication of this information as a guide to permit the judge to decide whether
to allow the expert to testify and to permit the jury to evaluate his
testimony is desirable. I hope, however, that the study does not mean to
recommend that any particular field of experts should have the absolute
ability to regulate who may testify in their field of expertise. Even
conceding that such power, or something approaching it, may exist in
the areas of professional licensure and related fields, I see no reason in
logic to permit it to spill over into the field of litigation and I would be
pragmatically opposed to it. However, the formulation of such criteria
would certainly be a benefit to the practicing lawyer and I am sure, as
a matter of actual practice, more and more they would come to select
as experts persons who have the qualifications which are recommended.
V.

THE SERIATED TRIAL

In general, I agree that the use of the seriated trial is desirable. It
would certainly have many obvious advantages in that it would tend
to eliminate the inappropriate influence of sympathy or prejudice which
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may result from the presentation of testimony on the issue of damages.
It would shorten some trials in that a decision favorable to the defendant after the liability stage of the trial would make the damage
stage trial unnecessary. It would also probably make it unnecessary
in many cases where the plaintiff prevails, because the defendant's attitude toward settlement would be substantially changed by the loss
of the liability question. In addition, a seriated trial would probably
make it easier for the parties to schedule the appearance of their various
experts and have many other possible advantages. However, I have
one or two misgivings about the suggestion which I would like to call
to the reader's attention.
(a) In any event, I do not think the seriated trial requires that an
election be made between dual theories of negligence and strict liability
at the pre-trial stage. Why would it not be possible to have the liability
stage further segmented, so that the issues could be tried first on the
theory of strict liability and, after that is submitted to the jury, if
necessary, permit the issue of negligence then to be submitted? If the
problem of jury bias is a specter, I see no reason why these issues could
not be tried to separate juries. It does not seem to me that the concept of a jury trial requires, in seriated trials, that the same group of
jurors hear evidence on all the issues, any more than this is required
where a case is remanded for trial after verdict on liability for new
trial on the issue of damages.
(b) We should also be at least sensitive to the possibility that the
present mode of trial may have offsetting advantages which would be
lost in the seriated trial. I raise the possibility that the testimony relating to damages and injuries may have certain beneficial effects in
the trial process which would be lost in the seriated trial. One such
benefit would be the fact that the jurors obviously pay more attention
in a serious case than in one which they regard as not serious. The
seriousness of the injuries would have some tendency to alert them to
the need to follow the liability testimony more carefully. Another benefit from the ordinary mode of trial may lie in the fact that the jurors
get some respite from the necessary educational process which the
presentation of technical evidence very often requires. Any one of us
who has listened to a long lecture in class about a technical subject
knows that there is a fatigue point reached which must be broken by
a recess or some other device. A significant device used by many educators and some of our greatest authors is to interlard the presentation
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so that different matters are presented at different times. The attention span is thus not overworked, since the human mind can, with
some degree of facility, go from one subject to another without having
lost what was absorbed. Indeed, the subconscious process of absorption
of the material previously presented may be enhanced by the device.
In other words, I am not convinced that the jurors will be more understanding of the technical evidence if it is presented to them in a highly
concentrated form at one stage of the trial. At the very least, I think
some effort should be made to test this theory empirically before the
possibility is wholly overlooked.
Finally, I would suggest that our legal system retains vitality to the
degree that it accommodates to altered conditions. A serious perusal of
the proposed changes is warranted; when a new and far reaching rule of
law is adopted, the trial bar must ask itself whether the traditional
format will suffice. Whether the instant program finds a favorable reception is perhaps less important than the receptivity of the bar to
such modifications as may be dictated by the requirements of an altered
premise of liability.
What was said by the noted anthropological expert Paul Bohaunan,
in commenting on the ability of our institutions to survive, may contain
a message to the legal profession: ".

.

. change is not doom; it is the

very antithesis of doom. Doom is to be found in the struggle to resist
change-salvation comes with understanding it."'
1. Bohaunan, Beyond Civilization, 80
Feb. 1971).
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